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Narrative, Interpretation,  
and the Ratification of the Constitution 
Pauline Maier 
  I am grateful to the participants in this forum for their careful and enthusiastic responses to Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788.     Some comments usefully extend the discussion beyond what’s in the book .  Maeva Marcus pushes the story into the 1790s, when the new Supreme Court took up issues that had played a role in the ratification debates, and demonstrates the continued fluidity of constitutional understandings.   For both Marcus and Seth Cornell, the complexity of arguments described in the book weighs powerfully against modern judicial theories of “originalism.”   However, as Cornell correctly observes, I deliberately avoided discussing the modern debate over originalism in Ratification, and I intend to do the same thing here.   It seems more appropriate to use this opportunity to address the “authorial decisions” that interest Todd Estes and the more general issue of how the book contributes to historical interpretations of ratification, an event that one reviewer described as “one of the greatest political brawls of all time.”i
    From the very beginning--- in the late 1990s, when I agreed to write the book for 
Simon and Schuster, and long before it had even a title--- Ratification was defined as a 
narrative history.   The book would tell the story of the ratification of the Constitution by 
looking at the popularly elected state conventions that decided the Constitution’s fate.  Its 
intended audience consisted not only of professional historians and other academics, but 
that part of the reading public with an interest in American history.   Given its subject 
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matter, it was also likely to attract the interest of those members of the legal community 
who specialize in constitutional law.  
 Narrative histories written for broad audiences have had an honorable place in 
American history over the past two centuries, but modern historians are not, I think, 
trained to write narrative.   The discipline is more geared to asking questions and 
answering them, or proposing hypotheses and gathering evidence to support them, than to 
telling stories.   Narrative histories are no less interpretive than the kinds of history we 
are used to writing, but their interpretations are buried in the stories they tell.  Narrative 
histories also pose challenges of organization and content distinct from those of analytical 
history.  They require a different kind of artfulness and a series of strategic decisions that 
come from the character of the story, the intended audience, and, as always, the 
documentary record.  
     Take for example what Seth Cotlar refers to as the “opening chapter” of the book but 
that is in fact labeled a Prologue.  No book on ratification geared for both non-specialists 
and specialists can begin on September 17, 1787, when the federal Convention adjourned 
and the ratification process began: It has to provide background information on the 
problems that led to the calling of the Convention and that the Constitution was meant to 
resolve.  The Papers of George Washington: Confederation Seriesii provided a rich and 
reader-friendly way to accomplish that task since in late 1786 and early 1787 Washington 
and his correspondents, often old Army officers, discussed at length the worrisome state 
of the nation and what could be done to set things right.  The Prologue ends with 
Washington leaving for Philadelphia on May 8,1787; Chapter One begins with delegates 
leaving Philadelphia on September 18 with a six-page printing of the Constitution and 
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two other documents the Convention had adopted tucked into their baggage.  “The people 
debate the Constitution” in the body of the book, in numbered chapters between the 
Prologue, which provides background information, and the Epilogue, which is on the 
period after Congress officially declared the Constitution ratified.      
Why not start, Todd Estes asks, with William Findley or Governor George 
Clinton or Elbridge Gerry or John Lamb or the printer Eleazer Oswald rather than 
Washington, or with “The View from Pittsburgh” rather than “The View from Mount 
Vernon”?   Because none of those persons could convey the sense “of crisis requiring 
immediate attention and far-reaching reforms” that led to the Constitution and because 
nothing in Pittsburgh compared to the rich cache of letters moving in and out of Mount 
Vernon before the federal Convention met.   As Estes himself says, “Federalists were the 
ones pushing the action.”  Those who criticized of the Constitution (and often questioned 
the existence of a crisis) could not come into the story until there was a Constitution to 
criticize.    
Introducing Washington and his correspondents early in the book had another 
advantage since those same correspondents wrote Washington throughout the ratification 
process, reporting on developments with the states and assessing the Constitution’s 
chances of being enacted as circumstances changed.   In a book that tells the stories of a 
series of state conventions whose members appear, sometimes briefly, and then often 
disappear, it is useful to have a handful of characters who surface throughout the text.  
David Brookhiser, who knows something about narrative, said Washington served as the 
book’s “Greek chorus”;iii I thought of Washington and his correspondents more 
prosaically as a string that held the “beads” of my story together.   And, although the 
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Prologue describes Washington pondering whether to attend the Convention and the 
Epilogue shows him agonizing in much the same way over becoming President, those 
two scenes do not shape the trajectory of what lies between, as Estes suggests.  The 
succession of ratifying conventions does that. 
That focus raised a more fundamental issue: how to define a clear story line for an 
event that happened in thirteen places, sometimes simultaneously.  There the nature of 
the documentary record suggested a solution. In 1986, James H. Hutson catalogued a list 
of problems with the records of the state ratifying conventions that probably explain why, 
as R.B. Bernstein observes, the subject received no “comprehensive historical treatment” 
until now.  Some states’ debates were not recorded, and the published “debates” of others 
suffered from the limited skills of the stenographers, their willingness to let speakers 
correct the texts of their speeches, and a bias toward the Federalists who often subsidized 
the preparation and publication of the debates.iv
By the end of 2009, the DHRC had published fourteen volumes on ratification in 
eight states.  There are dramatic disparities in the surviving documentary records for 
different states: Pennsylvania got one volume;
   In the quarter century since Hutson 
wrote, The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution (DHRC) has 
gone far to overcome those problems.  By collating the published “debates” with the 
conventions’ official journals, notes kept by delegates and other witnesses to the 
conventions’ sessions, newspaper accounts, and private correspondence, it allows 
scholars to assess and fill holes in the published versions of the state debates. The editors 
of the DHRC could not, however, supply accounts of state convention debates that went 
unrecorded.   
v Delaware, New Jersey, Connecticut, and 
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Georgia fit in another.  Virginia got three volumes, Massachusetts four, New York an 
astounding five.  Although it had five states to go, the series had covered all but one 
state—North Carolina--- whose convention debates were recorded and published.  I 
decided to describe in detail Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York, all of 
which were key states in the unfolding story of ratification and whose conventions were 
both distinctive and well documented, and to fold the other states into the narrative at 
appropriate chronological points.  Consequently, the six chapters that Estes says are 
devoted to Virginia and New York include sub-sections on Rhode Island, Maryland, 
South Carolina, and each of New Hampshire’s two conventions.  Estes asks whether New 
York and Virginia were important enough to merit such extensive treatment.  I think the 
answer is clear.  Imagine a “United States” without those two states and North Carolina, 
which refused to ratify in the summer of 1788, remembering that North Carolina and 
Virginia extended from the Atlantic to Mississippi and included what are now the states 
of Tennessee, Kentucky, and West Virginia.  Could so segmented a nation have 
survived? 
 
 In the introduction to Ratification, I explained that the book would test a theory 
that I once heard Barbara Tuchman describe.  A book can build tension in telling a story 
even if readers know the outcome, she said, so long as it does not mention the outcome 
until it occurs.   That meant the book could say nothing that suggested the Constitution 
would be ratified until its story arrived at June 1788, when both New Hampshire and 
Virginia voted to ratify assuming they were the critical ninth state.  Nor could the book 
open with a theory of why it would be ratified.  And yet as I worked through the story of 
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ratification, I found myself questioning much of what I had previously thought (and 
taught) based on previous scholarship.   My conclusions were also powerfully at odds 
with Seth Cotlar’s assertions that the contest was between an elite set of Federalists and 
Antifederalists fueled by a “massive popular opposition,” and that a “majority of ‘the 
people”’ responded… negatively to the Constitution in the fall of 1787.”   He seeks a 
“big picture interpretation” that defines what “values or interests” united both “the 
opposition” to the Constitution and its supporters.  Like the categories of contenders he 
uses, the interpretations he proposes take the form of dichotomies: “rural versus urban…, 
commercial versus the moral economy, the few versus the man, debtors versus creditors, 
classical republicans versus liberals, or provincial men of little faith versus cosmopolitan 
men of the enlightenment.” 
Start with the terms “Federalist” and “Antifederalist.”   I was a good way into 
writing the book when I realized that the only documents that used the word 
“Antifederalist” were by Federalists.  It was a Federalist term, and, moreover, as 
Pennsylvania’s William Findley said, a “name of reproach,” and one he treated “with 
contempt.”vi  Federalists claimed that “Antifederalists” were not new arrivals on the 
political scene, but knee-jerk opponents of federal power who had opposed all efforts to 
strengthen the central government since long before the federal Convention met.  They 
were, moreover, state politicians who feared for their jobs or individuals who saw the 
Constitution as a threat to their private economic interests.  Neither of those 
generalizations checked out.  I felt uncomfortable calling dead people by a name they 
considered, for good reason, a term of opprobrium, and thought telling the story of 
ratification using Federalist terms would tilt it in their direction.  Eventually I decided to 
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use the word “Antifederalist” only if it appeared in quotations or if the persons so 
designated accepted it, which occurred only in the upper Hudson Valley of New York.vii
Thanks to the federal Convention’s insistence that the states had to ratify or reject 
the Constitution, the final state convention votes were vote “yea” or “nay.”  The strains of 
opinion that fed into that stark division were, however, more complicated.   Contrary to 
Federalist charges, virtually everyone recognized the need to strengthen the central 
government.  The issue was how. 
  
That also avoided other problems that follow from describing the contest as between 
Federalists and Antifederalists:  It suggests that there were national parties, which there 
were not (although divisions over the Constitution sometimes coincided with state 
parties), and that, in the way of dichotomies, one was “for” the Constitution and the other 
“against,” which was also incorrect.  
Initially some contenders preferred giving more power to the Confederation and 
therefore literally opposed ratifying the Constitution. However, the greater part of those 
who criticized the Constitution saw it as a possible solution to the country’s needs if 
certain ambiguous and dangerous provisions were amended before it was ratified.  
Although Federalists agreed that the Constitution should be ratified as written, they, too, 
differed among themselves.  Some preferred a more centralized system that would 
dominate the states.  Others were happy leaving the states in control of their internal 
affairs and sometimes favored amendments not so different from those proposed by the 
Constitution’s critics.  They said, however, that any amendments should be enacted only 
after Constitution’s ratification using the provisions in Article V.     
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In late 1787, the “Federal Farmer” described precisely these four groups of 
contenders.  The categories also correspond with James Madison’s description of the 
divisions in Virginia politics, except that Madison recognized no distinctions among 
those who were for “adopting the Constitution without attempting amendments.”  The 
division among critics of the Constitution occurred not just among essay writers and 
convention delegates, but also on the grass roots level: In Massachusetts, for example, the 
town of Harvard preferred strengthening the Confederation over the wholesale 
transformation the “proposed Constitution” would bring, although many more town 
returns suggested that amendments might resolve their reservations on the 
Constitution.viii
If, then, the critical division was between those who favored amendments prior to 
ratification and those who insisted on considering amendments only after the Constitution 
went into effect, the likelihood of finding profound socio-economic or intellectual 
differences between them seems less promising than if it were between those who were 
“for” or “against” the Constitution.   There is, however, one distinction that seemed 
almost universal.  Communities along the Atlantic coast were uniformly in favor of 
ratification, as were commercial centers in the interior.    Enthusiasm for the Constitution 
   Moreover, affiliations sometimes shifted as circumstances changed.  By 
the time their state conventions met, onetime advocates of a strengthened Confederation 
such as John Lansing in New York and Patrick Henry in Virginia had become advocates 
of prior amendments.  In several close states, the Constitution passed because a subset of 
the prior-amendments advocates settled for recommending amendments to be considered 
once the new government began.   And once a convention voted to ratify, some 
Federalists voted to recommend amendments that their colleagues disdained. 
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there pulled in everyone from elite merchants and lawyers through artisans and dock 
workers (thus cutting through class lines), all of whom foresaw---correctly--- that 
ratification and the institution of a strong new national government would bring a major 
revival of American commerce.     Those who opposed ratification of the unamended 
Constitution tended to come from inland areas where the prospect of commercial 
prosperity was less enticing.  The amendments they favored did, indeed, demonstrate fear 
of a small and distant Congress whose members were unfamiliar with the circumstances 
of those for whom it legislated.  That for them was an issue of representation, and the 
legislative decisions most at issue concerned taxes.   
Cotlar’s effort to discount the significance of the linked issues of taxation and 
representation seems to me utterly at odds with scholarship on the Revolution.  Whatever 
the history of the phrase “no taxation without representation,” those two issues were of 
central significance starting with the opening years of the struggle with Britain.  “The 
issue of the day was taxation,” Edmund S. Morgan said in a landmark article that helped 
reopen the literature of the Revolution.  In keeping with English practice, colonists held 
that “taxes were the ‘free gift’ of the people who paid them, and as such could be leveled 
only by a body which represented them.”ix
Moreover, oppressive taxation became a reality in the mid-1780s, when ---as Max 
M. Edling and Mark D. Kaplanoff discovered--- taxes rose to a multiple of the pre-war 
level in several states due to an ill-considered effort to pay off their war debt rapidly.  The 
greater part of the tax burden rook the form of regressive poll and property taxes (i.e. 
   The threat of oppressive taxes might have 
been prospective, but that was enough to mobilize colonial resistance in the decade 
before 1774.   
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“direct taxes”) that were especially burdensome to farmers.  “Perhaps at no point… were 
taxes more controversial,” Edling and Kaplanoff said, “than in the period between the 
peace treaty of 1783 and the meeting of the Philadelphia Convention in 1797.”  The 
heightened tax burden helps explain the rural insurgency of the period, and its demise 
(except in areas affected by the new whiskey tax) after Alexander Hamilton’s assumption 
of state debts relieved the states of a burden that accounted for as much as 90% of their 
state budgets and led to a massive tax cut.x
In the meantime, oppressive state taxes fed popular fears that a Congress 
insufficiently representative of the people would add federal poll or property taxes to 
those already in place.   All five states that proposed amendments wanted to allow state 
legislatures---where the people were more fully represented than in Congress---to prevent 
the collection of federal “direct taxes” by raising their states’ portion of the general levy 
in whatever manner they considered easiest for their people to bear.  Leading Federalists 
such as Washington and Madison had no objection to many of the proposed amendments; 
indeed, they, too, had misgivings on the Constitution’s provisions on representation.  
However, they firmly rejected the tax amendment because they thought it would restore 
the failed requisition system of the Confederation, cause endless haggling, and undermine 
the restoration of public credit.
    
xi  That issue keyed to others: whether the states would 
survive if an insufficiently representative Congress had the comprehensive taxing power 
in Article I, Section 8; whether liberty could survive in the “Consolidated” government 
that would emerge after state power collapsed, and ultimately whether the Constitution 
would save the Revolution or undermine all that Americans had suffered and died for 
during the revolutionary war.   That was material enough for a good brawl. 
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 Who were “We the people”?  The category included what Bernstein, citing Henry 
Adams, calls “the American ‘political population,’” that is those adult white men who 
qualified for the vote.  New York, however, expanded the category by eliminating the 
property qualification used in legislative elections: There all white men twenty-one years 
of age or older could vote for convention delegates.  Massachusetts, like several other 
states, did not expand the franchise, and used the same apportionment for the convention 
as for the legislature, such that towns with at least 150 rateable polls (tax-paying men at 
least sixteen years of age) could send a delegate and more as their population rose.  The 
towns not only chose delegates but often discussed the Constitution with great 
seriousness: The little town of Richmond in western Massachusetts held four 
informational meetings before deciding the Constitution was no good “as it now stand” 
(that is, without amendments); other towns read the Constitution  out loud, “paragrapft by 
paragraft,” as one report says, with pauses so townsmen could comment. In the end, the 
towns elected a whopping 370 convention delegates, over 100 more than they sent to the 
legislature in the spring of 1786, which was the largest legislature in a decade.xii  In 
Virginia, Madison noticed that the electorate was less deferential to their leaders than 
usual in the convention elections, more insistent that delegates conform to its ideas of 
what should be done.xiii
       Everywhere newspapers were filled with news and essays on the Constitution, whose 
strengths and weaknesses were debated not only in town and county meetings but in 
streets, taverns, and homes, pulling in people outside the “political population.”  In the 
one account we have of a rip-roaring argument within a home, three of the four 
participants, including the protagonist, were women.
 
xiv  Nor were the people “out of 
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doors” uniformly opposed to the Constitution, as Cotlar assumes: Federalists joined in a 
full-fledged riot in Albany, where “Antis” had ceremonially burned the Constitution on 
July 4, 1788; forcefully ended an election in North Carolina when it seemed to be going 
against them, and attacked or threatened critics of the Constitution in Philadelphia and 
New York.  Indeed, a good bit of evidence runs against Cotlar’s assumption that a 
majority of the people responded “negatively” to the Constitution.xv
Finally, to suggest that the ratification conventions were ho-hum events 
dominated by the usual elites ignores the presence of farmers, gristmill owners, and the 
like, some of whom took the floor in the final days of a convention to report what 
conclusions they drew from the debates of more oratorically gifted colleagues, and who 
were sometimes noticeably nervous if their views had become out of sync with those of 
their “grass roots” constituents.  The entire process, from the election of delegates 
through the deliberations of the conventions, was an extraordinary event for the time.  As 
Bernstein says, “by the standards of politics in the late eighteenth century Atlantic 
world,” the enactment of the Constitution was “an unprecedented exercise of popular 
sovereignty.” 
   
 
        Like other books that take up previously neglected subjects, Ratification opens new 
lines of inquiry, some of which Bernstein summarizes.  I will add another.  Although bills 
of rights were a popular issue in the state ratification debates, of the five states that both 
ratified and recommended amendments, only Virginia formally asked that a bill of rights 
be added to the Constitution.  However, Virginians who ardently supported that demand, 
such as Patrick Henry and Richard Henry Lee, were bitterly disappointed with the 
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amendments the first federal Congress proposed.  Neither they nor, for that matter, 
anybody else--- not Washington, or Jefferson, or Madison--- referred to the twelve 
amendments proposed by Congress or the ten ratified by the end of 1791 as a “bill of 
rights.”   When did that term become commonplace, and why? 
      Come to think of it, I might take a crack at that question myself. 
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People,’ the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution (Oxford and 
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 The division of opinion in South Carolina is hard to measure because western 
parts of the state were severely under-represented in both the state legislature and the 
ratifying convention. 
